Fakti.lv

Ogrei būs būtiska loma Latvijas karavīru situācijas uzlabošanā Afganistānā

ogresfakti
Publicēts: 2010-10-14 09:35:00 / Pašvaldība

Komentāri (5)

Ziņot redakcijai

Izdrukāt

Ogres novada dome plāno slēgt līgumu ar Afganistānas pilsētu Meimanu, kurā šobrīd atrodas lielākā daļa Latvijas nacionālā kontingenta karavīru, tajā skaitā 15-20 karavīri no Ogres novada, informē Ogres novada domes priekšsēdētāja vietnieks Egils Helmanis.

Atbalstu iecerei Ogres novada domei nosūtītā vēstulē paudis Nacionālo bruņoto spēku komandieris, ģenerālmajors R.Graube. Viņš norāda, ka “šāda veida projekti uzlabo pašvaldības vadītāju un iedzīvotāju attieksmi pret latviešu karavīriem kopumā.”

Šā gada augustā Ogres novada domes priekšsēdētāja vietnieks Egils Helmanis Meimanas skolas bērniem nogādājis labdarības akcijā saziedotās mantas. E.Helmanis norāda, ka dažādu Afganistānas bērniem mācībām nepieciešamu lietu savākšanā aktīvi iesaistījušies Ogres skolu audzēkņi. R.Graube pauž pateicību domes priekšsēdētājam Edvīnam Bartkevičam un viņa vietniekam E.Helmanim par “ieguldīto darbu labdarības projekta realizācijā.”

Sadarbības līgums, kas sagatavots latviešu un angļu valodā, paredz draudzības veicināšanu starp Ogri un Meimanu. Līgumā norādīts arī, ka “sadarbība starp pašvaldībām veicina labāku savstarpēju sapratni starp tautām.”

Līgums ir īss un ietver četrus punktus:

1.Sadraudzības mērķis ir zināšanu un pieredzes apmaiņa un savstarpējo attiecību attīstība un uzlabošana.

2.Puses atbalsta sadarbību pašvaldību darba plānošanā un sociālajā sfērā, balstoties uz savstarpējiem cieņas un partnerības principiem un saskaņā ar katrā valstī spēkā esošajiem normatīvajiem aktiem.

3.Sadarbība var notikt un apmaiņu var veikt starp vietējiem politiķiem, pašvaldībām, pašvaldību iestādēm, sabiedrību, uzņēmumiem, nevalstiskajām organizācijām un atsevišķiem pilsoņiem.

4.Ceļojuma un uzturēšanās izmaksas, kas radušās pašvaldību sadarbības un apmaiņu laikā, tiek regulētas šādi: katra puse sedz savas ceļojuma izmaksas; uzņemošā puse sedz uzturēšanās izmaksas.

Galīgo lēmumu par sadarbības līguma slēgšanu dome plāno pieņemt nākamceturtdien.

Vārds vai segvārds:*
Skaitlis "7":*
Komentārs:*

	Portāla Fakti.lv vadība neatbild par rakstiem pievienotajiem apmeklētāju komentāriem, kā arī aicina to autorus, rakstot atsauksmes, ievērot morāles un pieklājības normas, nekurināt un neaicināt uz rasu naidu, iztikt bez rupjībām. Lūguma neievērošanas gadījumā rakstu komentēšanas iespēja var tikt liegta.

AI>AI>AI
2010-10-14 21:44:16

Vai tad Helmanim nav citu darbu ko darīt? Kur viņš mums ievilinājis! Starp narkomāniem,lai pašam būtu iemesls komandējumā aizbraukt,un kadi tālākie plāni? Pakistāna?

https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Security%20Archive/Sec_+_HA_Monthly_5_August_2010_FIN
2010-10-14 13:42:39

AFGHANISTAN Humanitarian Security in Afghanistan August 2010 What is the reality of the security situation for humanitarian workers in Afghanistan? Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organisations (IOs) have been providing humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan for many decades, responding to the various wars and natural disasters that have affected the country. Such organisations are by their very nature focused on humanitarian issues, and therefore their capacity to provide for and focus on their own security has, until recently been a secondary concern. However, since the security situation in Afghanistan is so precarious, security issues can no longer be sidelined in the way they once were. Following an intensification of attacks on humanitarian workers over the past decade, aid organisations have been forced to reassess their attitudes to security issues, radically altering their safety policies in order to ensure the protection of their staff members. Nowadays, humanitarian organisations are developing staff training, resources and manpower to make the delivery of assistance safer in response to the changing operational environment. The provision of humanitarian assistance has presented a significant challenge during the past 30 years of turmoil in Afghanistan, yet according to the Feinstein International Center report “Humanitarianism Under Threat,” security problems were not always as severe as they are now: deliberate attacks against aid workers were almost non-existent in the 1980s. The article indicates that during the years of Taliban rule, humanitarian workers were seldom targeted and usually perceived as neutral. However, following the intervention by US-led coalition forces in 2001 and the formation of the Afghanistan Transitional Government in 2002 and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2004, the situation changed dramatically. Humanitarian aid workers became closely associated with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)2. UNAMA is known for its support for projects run by President Hamid Karzai‟s government; as a result, the humanitarian community‟s reputation for neutrality has been called into question. One of the major challenges humanitarian workers now face is in combating misconceptions about their role in Afghanistan. The Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) article “High Risk Humanitarianism” highlights the difficulty rural Afghans in particular have in distinguishing between NGO staff members and other private and military actors; this in turn may cause them to be suspicious of – and therefore reluctant to accept - aid in general, regardless of their needs. The article goes on to suggest that any collaboration with the Afghanistan government is seen as a justification for attacks by the Taliban. There has been a reported increase in attacks against aid workers since 2006, according to the Feinstein International Center, something they attributed not only to the increase in troop levels but also the perception that humanitarian assistance is no longer neutral. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) reports that attacks by armed opposition groups (AOGs) have increased by 51% and civilian casualty figures have risen by 23% since 2009. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the increase in security incidents can be attributed to several factors, including an increase in troop numbers, security force operations in the southern region, and significant Armed Opposition Group (AOG) activity in the south and south-east. While incident data from the daily UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) incident reports show a general deterioration in the security situation, OCHA and ANSO reported that the number of security incidents involving humanitarian aid workers appeared to show a general decline when compared to the same time period in 2009. The decline has been attributed to the AOGs‟ preoccupation with the February 2010 Marjah campaign in the south and the possibility that some AOGs are learning to value the aid community. UNDSS and ANSO both indicate that the most common types of security incident against the aid community are abductions, followed by threats, and entry of compound or school. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) report “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response,” also highlights the trend in kidnapping of aid workers by criminal groups and AOGs, either carried out separately or in collaboration with one another. Of the security Incidents reported to ANSO in 2007, criminal groups and AOGs were responsible for 61% and 39% of attacks respectively, with 65% of security incidents involving AOGs in 2008. Notable security incidents include the 02 July suicide attack in Kunduz in which an AOG initiated a complex attack against the compound of Development Alternatives, Inc., killing eight people, two of whom were NGO employees. Additionally, in April this year, five UN staff members were abducted and later released by AOGs in Badghis province. When combined with geographic pinpoints of specific attacks, the latest logistical road map (see Figure 3 page 3) of Afghanistan issued by the World Food Program (WFP) clearly shows the reliance by AOGs on major roadways that connect certain urban hubs such as Kunduz, Kabul, and Kandahar. Furthermore, many aid organisations focus their efforts on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who became homeless due to natural disasters (such as floods) and conflict. Many attacks aimed at aid organisations are consequently located near large groups of IDPs or disaster-prone areas such as in Khost province, neighbouring districts of Kandahar City, Rodat in Nangarhar, and Lashkar Gah in Helmand province. As shown in Figure 4, the number of incidents in a given area may also be a result of the density of humanitarian presence in that location. For example, in March 2010 the north and northeast of Afghanistan accounted for 40% of all incidents, in part because of the increased humanitarian presence in those regions. For instance, a high percentage of aid organisations committed to interventions in education are located in particularly volatile areas such as Kunduz and Khost province. According to the UNESCO report “Education Under Attack,” more than 260 attacks against schools were carried out in both. Judging by the ongoing insurgent attacks on personnel from NGOs, the UN, and IOs, the security situation for humanitarian workers in Afghanistan remains dangerous, and preventing such attacks from taking place continues to pose a significant challenge for humanitarian aid workers. To improve personal security and enhance survival in the event of a security incident, such as an attack or abduction, humanitarian aid workers need to be prepared before entering a potential conflict zone. Security training is therefore vital for the safe execution of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that workers are able to return to safer areas upon completion of their duties. To accomplish this task, many organisations offer some form of internal training intended to create situational awareness of the region where personnel will be deployed, as well building as a skill set which teaches them how to handle situations where personal safety might be jeopardised. In addition, NGOs rely more and more on security training from external sources, either in their respective home countries, or on arrival in Afghanistan if pre-deployment training is not sufficient or unavailable.

modžaheds
2010-10-14 12:25:04

Varbūt varam Zilajos kalnos izveidot arī kādu talibu nometni - ekstrēmo tūristu pievilināšanai

haha
2010-10-14 12:17:46

"Gudrā'' Helmaņa izgudrojums,lai taču pats brauc un dzīvo tur,var redzēt ka ar prātiņu tā pašvaki.

ISAF veterāns no Ogres
2010-10-14 10:05:33

Ārprāts! Meimanas pašvaldība sedz uzturēšanās izmaksas? Vai kāds vispār stādās priekšā, kādi tur ir dzīves apstākļi un kādas palikšanas iespējas? Un ko viņu tur ēdīs? Vai plāno izmantot ISAF militāro atbalstu transportēšanai, izmitināšanai un ēdināšanai, ko beigās apmaksās NBS? Pat ja aizlido līdz MES lidostai - kā nokļūs uz to Meimanu? IOs/NGOs ir savs tīkls, bet tādi tūristi no Ogres būs šokā jau pēc izkāpšanas no lidmašīnas. Ogres pārstāvjiem nav priekšstata, kur viņi plāno doties un kā viņus uzņems vietējā pašvaldība. Tur civilajiem nav pat elektrības ne ūdensvada. Domes ēkai elektrību ražo ģenerators. Kas viņus apsargās, lai talibi nesaņem kādu par ķīlniekiem vai vienkārši neuzspridzina?